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Abstract
This paper investigates some key aspects of convergence towards a single financial space in the
EU in the context of the activities of banks, capital (stock and bond) markets and internal funds
as sources of financing investment by non-financial companies (NFCs), and in terms of whether
the economies are converging towards an Anglo-Saxon (capital market oriented) or a
Continental (bank oriented) financial system. The paper proposes and implements novel
applications of econometric tests for convergence (hitherto popularised in the economic growth
literature) to OECD flow of funds data for the period 1972-1996 for seven EU member
countries: Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  The
evidence suggests some form of overall convergence of the EU financial systems on a variant of
the Anglo-Saxon model, depicting heavy reliance on internal financing as well as direct
financing via equity and bond markets, while bank debt is becoming relatively less important.
JEL Classification Numbers: G32
June  19981
1. Introduction
A contrast is often drawn between Anglo-Saxon (capital market oriented) financial systems, as
represented by the UK, and Continental (banking oriented) financial systems, as typified by
Germany (Doukas, Murinde and Wihlborg, 1998, p.10).  It is useful, however, to draw a
distinction between the terms “banks” and “banking” in the sense that the latter involves bank
lending via the creation of demand deposits in connection with a debt contract between the bank
and the borrower, deposit taking and the provision of associated money transmission services to
the public.  Increasingly, however, banks, especially in the EU, are engaging in both banking and
securities business i.e. universal banking, fund management and, more recently, insurance
business (“bancassurance” or “Allfinance”).  The term “bank oriented” may therefore have
various interpretations.  It could mean a system in which banks are the dominant institutions
providing both indirect (or intermediated debt) finance and access to direct finance from the
money and capital markets via instruments such as commercial bills and paper (money market
debt finance), bonds and Euro-notes (capital market debt finance) or shares
  (capital market
equity finance), inter alia.  The key distinctions here are between direct and indirect finance and
between debt and equity financing.  Since banking fundamentally involves the provision of
indirect finance, “bank oriented” could more narrowly be taken to mean that the most important
source of external financing for non-financial companies (NFCs) is bank loans.
Recent studies (e.g. Corbett and Jenkinson, 1994; Bertero, 1994; Edwards and Fischer,
1994) show that in most OECD countries bank lending is the most important source of external
financing, but that internal financing from retained profits is overall the most important source of
financing.  There is also some evidence of a shift from bank loans to direct financing from the
capital (and particularly the bond) markets as part of the securitisation process associated with
the financial liberalisation of the 1980s.  In addition, these studies stress the importance of
asymmetric information and principal-agent problems in understanding the interaction of
financial institutions and non-financial corporations, highlighting the corporate governance role
of financial institutions.  In this context, a bank oriented system could be viewed as one in which
banks are the key financial institutions as regards corporate governance by virtue of being both
providers of debt finance and the key institutional holders of equity, as in the Universal Banking
system of Germany (and to some extent France (Bertero, 1994)) and in the Japanese system.  In
contrast, in capital market oriented systems the key institutional shareholders are pension and2
insurance funds.  This is especially true in the UK, where share ownership is heavily
concentrated (see Mayer, 1994).  Hitherto, the institutional shareholders in the UK have not
exercised their voting rights (including proxy voting rights) as actively as the German
Grossbanken.  The capital markets in the UK also influence management behaviour via the
threat posed by aggressive mergers and acquisitions activity.  In contrast, in continental Europe,
unsolicited take-over bids have, at least until recently, been largely unknown.
This “battle of the systems” (Walter, 1993), regarding the relative merits of the bank
oriented and capital market oriented systems of corporate governance, is integral to the policy
debates relating to the evolution of financial systems in the EU member countries following the
Single European Market of 1993.  If direct financing is increasing relative to bank financing, the
capital markets will have a greater role to play in the future in hitherto bank dominated financial
systems.  To the extent that bank oriented systems are more “long-termist”, this trend may lead
to a spread of “short-termism” in investment and “research and development” expenditure
decisions.  Counteracting this development, and helping to deepen capital markets in previously
bank-dominated system, the privatisation of pensions, in response to ageing population, and the
associated budgetary pressures being caused by maintaining “pay-as-you go” state pension
schemes, will lead to a build up of pension funds.  These funds will increasingly invest in shares
(stocks/equities) as restrictions requiring large proportions of the funds in domestic government
bonds are removed in response to competitive pressures to achieve acceptable returns for the
investors.  Because pension funds are dealing with long term savings they naturally take a
strategic view and this should help counteract any bias towards short-termism.  The creation of
the single currency area within the EU (“Euroland”) is expected to give a boost to the corporate
bond market, which is much less developed in EU countries than in the US.  The expected rapid
growth in the Euro-based corporate bond market will further reduce the role of bank loans as a
source of debt finance.  Large corporates have long had access to the Euromarkets, but it is
expected that bank debt will be increasingly used to finance small to medium sized companies.  
Singular among the many expectations of EU member countries was that the launching
of a borderless Europe in January 1993 would impact on the financial systems of the member
countries by facilitating the achievement of a single financial space in the EU.  This has moved a
step closer with the decision to proceed with the creation of a single currency to be adopted by3
most of the EU states.  In “Euroland”, the shift towards convergence can be expected to
accelerate.
This paper investigates whether there has been some convergence towards a single
financial space in the EU in terms of the activities of banks, stock markets and bond markets as
sources of funding for investment by NFCs.  The idea is to determine whether or not there has
been a systematic change in the relative shares by banks, stock markets or bond markets in the
overall capital structure of the NFCs.  A test for convergence is used to indicate if there has been
a shift towards a sustained increase in the relative share of bank financing as a percentage of the
total capital structure of NFCs, given an initial level (say at 1972), in a manner that suggests the
economies are moving towards a bank oriented system.  Similarly, the convergence test is
applied to determine if there has been a shift towards a sustained increase in the relative share of
equity (and/or bond) financing as a percentage of the total NFC investment financing, given an
initial level, in a manner that suggests the economies are moving towards a capital market
oriented system.  Finally, the convergence test is applied to determine if there has been a shift
towards a sustained increase in the relative share of internal finance as a percentage of the total
NFC investment financing, given an initial level, in a manner that suggests the managers of the
NFCs behave in conformity with the pecking-order theory of financing choices and hence utilise
retained earnings first before they resort to debt, equity or bond financing
1.  Hence the
convergence tests will, inter alia, also shed light on whether the financial systems of EU
member countries are converging towards a “bank oriented” or a “capital market oriented”
model.
The paper makes at least three major contributions.  First, it proposes and implements a
novel application of econometric tests for convergence of the financial systems of the EU
member countries with special reference to the financing of NFCs, hence shedding light on the
interaction between the financial and real sectors in the context of the convergence criteria. 
Second, it covers the period in which there has been substantial financial innovation,
liberalisation and regulatory reform.  The process started in the 1970s in some of the countries
under study here (e.g. the UK; see Mullineux, 1987a) and accelerated in the 1980s, particularly
from the mid 1980s in the UK and France (Mullineux, 1987b; Bertero, 1994).  Broadly, the
1970s can be regarded as the decade of internationalisation (Pecchioli, 1983) and the 1980s as
the decade of securitisation
2 leading into an explosion in the use of derivatives in the late 1980s4
early 1990s.  During this period, exchange rate controls have been progressively lifted both
outside and within Europe, banking system and stock-exchanges have been deregulated and
reformed and a new regulatory and supervisory systems have been devised through the work of
the Basle Committee.  The net result of these international processes, combined with the single
financial market programme within the EU (Mullineux, 1992), has been an increase of
competition within and between member country banking systems and between these systems
and capital markets, particularly with regard to providing finance to NFCs.  The process of
securitisation might be expected to have led to convergence in the EU and, if it continues, to
encourage further convergence.  The growing competition amongst alternative financial systems
within the EU and between the EU and other countries can also be expected to force
convergence.  A similar array of financial products has increasingly become available in all
countries as ’gaps’ in the market are progressively identified and exploited.  Third, the paper
yields evidence which, in some respects, complements the findings of previous work (Corbett
and Jenkinson, 1994; Bertero, 1994; Edwards and Fischer, 1994); it is found that in the EU
member countries, and for most of the period 1972-1996, equity financing was increasing in
importance, but that internal financing from retained profits was overall the most important
source of financing.
The remainder of the paper is structured into three sections.  Section 2 discusses the
approach taken to model convergence in this paper.  The estimation and testing results are
reported in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes.
2. Modelling Convergence of Financial Systems
Convergence has been mainly modelled using time series, cross-section and panel data
techniques with respect to economic growth models.  The time series techniques tend to rely
on rho (s) convergence, measured as a change in the variance (s
2) of a given variable (e.g. ln
Y) in order to establish whether the dispersion of the variable has actually increased over time.
  In the growth models, rich countries tend to give estimates of weak s  convergence; the
variance typically falling by about 0.01 while the poor country prices tend to indicate that the
rate of convergence is much higher, of the order of 0.03 (see Bernard and Darluf, 1996).5
In addition, most of the recent empirical literature uses regression analysis to test for
beta convergence, or conditional regression to the mean.  Quah (1993) has demonstrated that
although rho implies beta, the reverse is not implied.  However, beta convergence can be
regarded as rho convergence conditional on other random influences on growth.  This
involves running an OLS regression:
gi = a + byi(0) + ei(t) (1)
where gi = yi(t) - yi(0), and yi(t) is the logarithm of per capita GDP at time t for country i; gi is
the growth rate from time zero to time t, and by construction cov(ei, yi(0)) = 0.  It is
straightforward to show that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the variance of y to
decline over time is that the mean reversion coefficient beta is negative, since Var(yi(t) = (1 +
b)
2Var(yi(0)) + Var(ei).  The random noise will tend to increase the variance.  The idea is that
the degree of mean reversion must be sufficiently high relative to the level of noise if the
variance is to fall.  The sufficient condition is  b(2 +  b) > Var(ei) / Var(yi(0)) which is
equivalent to  R
2 > b/2.  If mean reversion overshoots the mean sufficiently, b < -2, dispersion
actually increases as the ordering of GDP is reversed.
This paper proposes and implements a novel application of modelling convergence in the
context of financial systems, encompassing banks, equity markets and bond markets.  The
literature on the microeconomics of the banking firm has tended to focus on the existence of
economies of scale and economies of scope in the banking industry.  In contrast to the neo-
classical growth model and endogenous growth models used in the growth literature, the early
studies started with a standard log linear Cobb-Douglas production function of the following
form:
q = go + a k + b m (2)
where q is an output measure (e.g. bank finance for NFCs), k and m are factor inputs into the
bank production process. However, this entailed a strong assumption regarding the shape of the
cost function i.e. returns to scale are assumed to be increasing everywhere (b < 1), constant
everywhere (b = 1) or decreasing everywhere (b >1), thus a u-shaped curve is not possible.  To
circumvent these limitations, a multiproduct translog production function is used:6
q = go + S ia i k i + 0.5S iS j b i j m j k i (3)
where b i j = b ji for all i, j.  A key output of the banking firm comprises loans to the business
sector, and thus amounts to bank financing of the NFCs in this paper.
The modelling procedure used for testing for convergence, based on equation (3), was
initially based on cross-section tests of unconditional and conditional convergence.  The cross-
section unconditional convergence tests were constructed as follows:
g i, T  =  a  + b q i , 0  +  e i, T (4)
where  g = qt - qt-1, and T is a fixed horizon.  Conditional convergence tests are constructed by
modifying equation (4) to include control variables:
g i, T  =  a  + b q i , 0  +  p x i, T +  e i, T (5)
where  x i, T denotes a vector of control variables.
Rather than using cross-section estimation, we used a GMM estimator of  the dynamic
fixed effects model with panel data to estimate the following equation with respect to the growth
of output of the banking sector, based on equation (3):
BFG t  =  a   +  b 1 BFG t-1  +  b 2 BFG t-2  +  b 3 BFY t  +  p 1 BMYt  +  p 2 ERt 
+  p 3 IR t  +  p 4  OPEN t   + e i, T (6)
where  BFG is the growth rate of bank finance to the NFCs; BFY is the initial level of bank loans
(at 1972); BMY is the financial deepening variable, calculated as the ratio of broad money (M2)
to GDP; ER is the nominal exchange rate; IR is the nominal interest rate; OPEN is a measure of
the degree of openness, calculated as the ratio of exports and imports to total GDP.  The control
variables BMY, ER and IR are consistent with the idea of monetary convergence stipulated by the
European Commission.  The monetary policy variables ER and IR could be interpreted here to
infer the potency of the respective policy instrument to the achievement of convergence.
As earlier noted the dichotomy between bank oriented financial systems and capital
market oriented financial systems implies the need for considering equity as an additional
element to bank debt in the capital structure of NFCs.  We extend the above convergence tests
for the EU banking systems to focus on the role of equity markets i.e. the provision of equity7
finance in the capital structure of NFCs, in line with modern corporate finance theory.  To test
for convergence of equity markets in the EU member countries, we apply a GMM estimator of 
the dynamic fixed effects model with panel data to estimate the following equation with respect
to the growth of output of the equity markets, namely equity financing of the NFCs:
EIG t  =  a   +  b 1 EIG t-1  +  b 2 EIG t-2  +  b 3 EIY t  +  p 1 BMYt  +  p 2 ERt 
+  p 3 IR t  +  p 4  OPEN t   + e i, T (7)
where  EIG is the growth rate of equity finance to the NFCs; EIY is the initial level of equity
finance (at 1972).  In this setting, the control variables BMY, ER and IR are consistent with the
idea of monetary convergence stipulated by the European Commission; the monetary policy
variables ER and IR could be interpreted here to infer the potency of the respective policy
instrument to the achievement of convergence of equity markets in the EU member countries.
In addition to bank debt and equity finance, bond issues are an important element of the
capital structure of NFCs, according to modern corporate finance theory.  Moreover, one would
expect that bond issues are likely to become more important in “Euroland” if the EU financial
system converges on the US model.  We extend the above convergence tests for the EU banking
systems and equity markets to focus on the role of the bond market i.e. corporate bond issues. 
To test for convergence of the bond in the EU member countries, we apply a GMM estimator of
 the dynamic fixed effects model with panel data to estimate the following equation with respect
to the growth of output of the corporate bond markets, namely bond issues for the financing of 
NFCs:
BIG t  =  a   +  b 1 BIG t-1  +  b 2 BIG t-2  +  b 3 BIY t  +  p 1 BMYt  +  p 2 ERt 
+  p 3 IR t  +  p 4  OPEN t   + e i, T (8)
where  BIG is the growth rate of bond financing by the NFCs; BIY is the initial level of bond
issues (at 1972).  The monetary policy variables ER and IR could be interpreted here to infer the
potency of the respective policy instrument to the achievement of convergence of corporate bond
markets in the EU member countries.
The pecking order theory of financing choices stipulates that managers prefer the use of
internal fund (e.g. retained earnings) before they resort to bank debt finance and equity8
financing.  To integrate the implications of this theory in our analysis, we extend the above
convergence tests for the EU banking systems, equity markets and bond markets to focus on the
role of internal finance in the capital structure of NFCs.  To test for convergence towards the use
of internal finance by the NFCs in the EU member countries, we apply a GMM estimator of  the
dynamic fixed effects model with panel data to estimate the following equation:
IFG t  =  a   +  b 1 IFG t-1  +  b 2 IFG t-2  +  b 3 IFY t  +  p 1 BMYt  +  p 2 ERt 
+  p 3 IR t  +  p 4  OPEN t   + e i, T (9)
where  IFG is the growth rate of internal financing by the NFCs; EIY is the initial level of the use
of internal finance by NFCs (at 1972).  The control monetary policy variables BMY, ER and IR
are consistent with the idea of monetary convergence stipulated by the European Commission,
but also capture the potency of the respective policy instrument to the achievement of
convergence by the EU member countries in the context of the use of internal finance by NFCs.
The data are taken from the OECD
3 flow of funds tables and cover the period 1972-1996
for 7 EU member countries: Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the
UK.  The flows of funds tables are produced in accordance with the internationally agreed
System of National Accounts (SNA) for 1993.  The tables record gross sources and gross uses of
funds for NFCs in Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK in
domestic currency (nominal) and percentage (of the total) in each year.
Unlike Corbet and Jenkinson (1994) and Mullineux (1996), we do not use net flows and
so our results are not directly comparable with their findings or the findings of Bertero (1994)
and Edwards and Fischer (1994).  Despite the fact that the gross flows used in this study over-
record investment financing, the netting procedure may at times hide some important
developments.  Debt can at times be raised to retire equity and vice versa.  During booms of
mergers and acquisitions debt and equity can be raised to buy equity (and control) of other firms,
rather than to fund physical investment.  As a result of the take-over a net reduction in equity
outstanding may occur (the shareholdings in the firm ’taken-over’ disappear as the shareholders
are paid off) and yet there has been an investment of a sort by the successful bidder, which now
owns the assets of the firm that has disappeared.  We should thus not be surprised to see
negative net  flows of equity in periods of high mergers and acquisition activity (i.e. mainly in9
the UK, given their aforementioned different tradition in the M&A sphere to ’continental’ EU
countries).  Negative equity flows can often occur when companies use retained profits or newly
raised debt to retire equity in response to changes in the relative cost of debt (and opportunity
cost of internal finance) and equity; given that equity flows are generally much smaller than
internal funding and bank lending flows, even in the UK.
Although the OECD flows of funds data are based on the SNA, Corbett and Jenkinson
(1994) observe that in each of the countries they studied (the US, the UK, Germany and Japan)
there were significant divergences of the data supplied to the OECD from agreed SNA
conventions.  In this paper we take the data as given; however, we use percentages of the total in
order to ensure greater comparability.  Nevertheless, for future research we believe that company
accounting data would have to be employed in order to achieve disaggregation by size of firm
and maturity of loans.
3. Estimation and Testing Results
The estimation and testing results for the convergence hypothesis with respect to bank debt,
equity finance, bond issues and internal finance, as reflected in equations (6) - (9) are reported in
Tables 1-4, respectively.
The results reported in Table 1 are at variance with the hypothesis that there has been a
tendency towards convergence among the EU member countries in terms of the use of bank debt
finance by NFCs.  It would appear that over time and across the seven countries the NFCs have
not shifted towards the use of bank debt for financing new investment.  Although the results for
all the six model variants show the expected negative sign on the initial level of bank
productivity (at 1972), tied down by variable BFY, there is hardly any statistically significant
estimates.  Hence we cannot regard the results as providing reliable evidence that the EU
member countries are converging towards a bank oriented system, in the context of an increase
in the relative share of the banking system (compared to equity and bond markets) in the overall
financing of new investment by NFCs.  Indeed, these results suggest that the relative bank
finance share is declining.  These results hold irrespective of whether we test for unconditional
convergence or whether we condition banking system convergence on a number of key policy
variables namely the financial deepening variable, the nominal exchange rate, the nominal
interest rate and a measure of the degree of openness.  The implication is that the nominal10
exchange rate and the interest rate are not potent monetary policy instruments in facilitating the
convergence of the banking sector in the seven EU member countries. 
Although our data are different from those used by Corbett and Jenkinson (1994),
Bertero (1994) and Edwards and Fischer (1994), we find that our findings are consistent with
their conclusions.  These authors, as well as Mullineux (1996), find that the level of bank
financing is similar in gross terms in Germany and the UK, the two countries that are de-facto
characterised by different banking systems.  Our results do not exhibit convergence perhaps
because much further convergence cannot be expected, given the level of similarity in bank
financing in these countries as documented by the above authors.11
Table 1.GMM estimation results for the dynamic fixed effects model
Dependent variable: Growth of bank finance (BFG)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -0.860 -0.040 -1.147 -1.036 -3.618 -3.292
(0.346) (0.979) (0.303) (0.380) (0.122) (0.348)
BFG(-1) -0.013 -0.065 -0.019 -0.029 -0.019 -0.130
(0.915) (0.649) (0.783) (0.851) (0.894) (0.573)
BFG(-2) 0.149 0.130 0.137 0.134 0.125 0.065
(0.312) (0.382) (0.362) (0.470) (0.456) (0.787)
BFYo -0.454 -0.436 -0.537 -0.427 -0.041 0.156
(0.503) (0.514) (0.446) (0.611) (0.961) (0.899)
BMY - -1.293 - - - -2.181
(0.492) (0.474)
ER - - 0.006 - - 0.000
(0.661) (0.986)
IR - - - 0.011 - 0.015
0.607 (0.594)
OPEN - - - - 6.345 8.257
0.191 (0.243)
Wald test 1.894 2.416 2.076 1.498 3.200 2.553
34 4 4 4 7
Sargant test 27.057 27.282 26.713 17.361 19.521 9.651
19 18 18 18 18 15
No of countries: 7
Observation: 119
Sample period: 1972-1996
·  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
·  values in parentheses are p-values
BFY0 is initial level of the share of bank finance (at 1972),
BMY is ratio of broad money to GDP,
ER is the nominal exchange rate,
IR is the nominal interest rate,
OPEN is the ratio of export and import to GDP.12
Table 2. GMM estimation results for the dynamic fixed effects model
Dependent variable: Growth of equity issues (EIG)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -16.060** -11.025 -16.174** -16.141** -17.976* -14.665
(0.001) (0.111) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.147)
EIG(-1) -0.188 -0.362* -0.187 -0.188 -0.180 -0.352*
(0.197) (0.074) (0.201) (0.199) (0.231) (0.090)
EIG(-2) -0.232* -0.427** -0.232* -0.232* -0.232* -0.431**
(0.066) (0.019) (0.067) (0.067) (0.074) (0.019)
EIY -5.397** -6.910** -5.427** -5.418* -5.409* -7.552**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
BMY - -15.279** - - - -15.735**
(0.008) (0.009)
ER - - 0.001 - - 0.020
(0.962) (0.530)
IR - - - 0.001 - -0.001
(0.897) (0.934)
OPEN - - - - 3.597 2.941
(0.537) (0.736)
Wald test 11.431 13.631 11.343 11.333 11.136 13.667
3 444 4 7
Sargant test 45.796 19.350 45.433 45.318 42.707 18.415
19 18 18 18 18 15
No of countries: 7
Observation: 119
Sample period: 1972-1996
·  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
·  values in parentheses are p-values
EIY0 is initial level of the share of internal finance (at 1972),  the rest of the variables are as
defined in Table 1.13
Table 2 reports the estimation and testing results for the hypothesis that there has been a
tendency towards convergence among the EU member countries in terms of the use of equity
finance by NFCs.  The results for all the six model variants show the expected negative sign on
the initial level of equity productivity (at 1972), tied down by variable EIY, with all the estimates
statistically significant.  Thus the results strongly support the convergence hypothesis, suggesting
that over time and across the seven EU member countries the NFCs have generally shifted
towards the use of equity finance for new investment; the stock markets have also increasingly
become important as a means of raising equity finance for new investment by NFCs.  However,
the UK remains a bit of an outlier.  We therefore regard the results as providing reliable evidence
that the EU member countries are converging towards a capital market oriented system, in the
context of an increase in the relative share of the equity market (compared to that of banks and
bond markets) in the overall financing of new investment by NFCs.  We find that the dynamics
become important in the second (but not the first) year i.e. EIG(-2), rather than EIG(-1), is
significant.  These results hold irrespective of whether we test for unconditional convergence or
whether we condition equity market convergence on a number of key policy variables namely
the financial deepening variable, the nominal exchange rate, the nominal interest rate and a
measure of the degree of openness.  The financial deepening variable (in models 2 and 6) is
statistically significant with a negative sign, suggesting that banking sector intermediation
activities (tied down by the broad money indicator M2) tend to reduce the degree of growth in
the equity issues of NFCs.  The nominal exchange rate and the interest rate are not potent
monetary policy instruments in facilitating the convergence of the equity markets in the seven
EU member countries.
The evidence summarised in Table 3 suggests that there has been a tendency towards
convergence among the EU member countries in terms of the use of company bond finance by
NFCs.  It is shown that over time and across the seven countries the NFCs have shifted towards
the use of bond issues to finance new investment.14
Table 3 GMM estimation results for the dynamic fixed effects model
Dependent variable: Growth of bond issues (BIG)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -20.945 -22.390 -30.493 -19.354 -21.197 -29.444
(-0.423) (-0.658) (0.632) (0.705) (0.672) (0.702)
BIG(-1) 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.032 0.025 0.031
(0.843) (0.855) (0.856) (0.815) (0.894) (0.830)
BIG(-2) -0.062 -0.072 -0.078 -0.062 -0.064 -0.0907
(0.870) (0.857) (0.846) (0.878) (0.872) (0.832)
BIY -0.514 -4.592 -8.101 -5.080 -4.936 -6.954
(0.706) (0.747) (0.660) (0.718) (0.740) (0.794)
BMY - 5.542 - - - 12.160
(0.882) (0.770)
ER - - -0.051 - - -0.042
(0.810) (0.891)
IR - - - -0.069 - -0.071
(0.597) (0.624)
OPEN - - - - 1.954 -6.373
(0.970) (0.928)
Wald test 1.894 2.416 2.076 1.498 3.200 2.553
df 3 4 4 4 4 7
Sargant test 27.057 27.282 26.713 17.361 19.521 9.651
df 19 18 18 18 18 15
No of countries: 7
Observation: 119
Sample period: 1972-1996
·  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
·  values in parentheses are p-values
BIY0 is initial level of the share of internal finance (at 1972),  the rest of the variables are as
defined in Table 1.15
Table 4 GMM estimation results for the dynamic fixed effects model
Dependent variable: Growth of internal finance (IFG)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -1.401 -2.806 -1.436 -1.195 -0.896 -1.913
(0.114) (0.073) (0.120) (0.265) (0.410) (0.361)
IFG(-1) -0.103 -0.092 -0.096 -0.100 -0.053 -0.058
(0.564) (0.632) (0.603) (0.622) (0.782) (0.797)
IFG(-2) -0.148 -0.157 -0.148 -0.153 -0.130 -0.143
(0.191) (0.194) (0.190) (0.234) (0.272) (0.300)
IFYo -2.124* -3.112* -2.154* -1.917 -2.376* -2.975
(0.092) (0.053) (0.093) (0.195) (0.074) (0.111)
BMY - 1.130 - - - 1.000
(0.258) (0.376)
ER 0.001 - - -0.001
(0.889) (0.817)




Wald test 3.549 4.379 3.558 3.067 4.083 4.159
df 3 4 4 4 4 7
Sargant test 39.327 33.096 39.303 30.278 36.522 26.216
df 19 18 18 18 18 15
No of countries: 7
Observation: 119
Sample period: 1972-1996
·  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
·  values in parentheses are p-values
IFY0  is the initial level of  the share of internal finance (at 1972),  the rest of the variables are
as defined in Table 1.16
Although the results for all the six model variants show the expected negative sign on the
initial level of bank productivity (at 1972), tied down by variable BIY, there is hardly any
statistically significant estimates.  Hence we cannot regard the results as providing reliable
(significant) evidence that the EU member countries are converging towards a bond (capital
market oriented) system, in the context of an increase in the relative share of the bond market in
the overall financing of investment by NFCs.  These results hold irrespective of whether we test
for unconditional convergence or whether we condition banking system convergence on a
number of key policy variables namely the financial deepening variable, the nominal exchange
rate, the nominal interest rate and a measure of the degree of openness.  The results also suggest
that the nominal exchange rate and the interest rate are not potent monetary policy instruments in
facilitating the convergence of the corporate bond market in the seven EU member countries. 
However, as noted previously the formation of “Euroland” can be expected to accelerate the
growth of the Euro-dominated corporate bond market if the US is any guide; this is consistent
with the weak (statistically insignificant but with expected sign) results we report in Table 3
above. 
Table 4 reports the evidence on the internal finance dimension.  The results suggest that
there has been a tendency towards convergence among the EU member countries in terms of the
use of  internal finance by NFCs.  It would appear that over time and across the seven countries
the NFCs have shifted towards the use of internal funds (e.g. retained earnings) for financing
new investment.  This evidence is consistent with the pecking order theory of financing choices.
 The results for all the six model variants show the expected negative sign on the initial level of
internal finance (at 1972), tied down by variable IFY; all the estimates are statistically significant
except those in models 4 and 6.  These exceptions show that the EU member countries do not
exhibit convergence, in the context of increasing the use of internal finance in the overall
financing of new investment by NFCs, if convergence is conditional to interest rate policy or to a
combination of financial deepening, exchange rate policy, interest rate policy and trade
liberalisation.  The implication is that these monetary policy instruments encourage the opening
up of the banking system, the equity market and the bond markets, making it less necessary for
NFCs to sustain their first recourse to internal finance.  As we would expect, if the banking
system and the capital (including bond and equity) markets are efficient, the pecking order
theory breaks down.17
The evidence on convergence with respect to internal finance is consistent with the
results obtained by Corbett and Jenkinson (1994), Bertero (1994) and Edwards and Fischer
(1994) who find that high levels of internal financing are confirmed for the UK and Germany,
particularly in the net figures and after noting that capital transfers can be regarded as internal
sources for publicly owned corporations in Germany.  These studies also find that in the Spanish
case, perhaps surprisingly given the relatively early stage of financial sector restructuring in that
country, internal financing counts for a very high level (over 100% in the 1980s) of investment
financing while, in net terms, bank financing and, in the 1990s, equity financing, make a
negative contribution.
In general, as they participate in a single market inaugurated in 1993 and following the
recent restructuring of their banking systems, EU member countries may expect convergence of
the financial systems on the prevailing “Continental” European model.  This model depicts
heavy reliance on internal financing with bank intermediated lending decreasing in importance
and increasingly competing with direct financing via equity and bond markets (especially the
Euro-note and bond markets) in the declining market for the external financing of investment. 
This might be the main plausible interpretation of the evidence obtained in this study.  We find
that there is a shift towards convergence, conditional as well as unconditional, with respect to
equity financing and internal financing  of NFCs in seven EU member countries; however, the
shift is less pronounced with respect to bond issues, while there is hardly any convergence at all
with respect to bank debt (or the banking system).  However, a great leap forward is expected in
the development of the corporate bond market following the adoption of the Euro; further
undermining the dominance of bank debt finance and leading to convergence on the US
financial system where the corporate bond markets are much more developed.  However, in
some countries, the banks are progressively diversifying into the provision of underwriting and
broking (of financial instruments) services to the NFCs who previously borrowed from them
more heavily via bank loans.  Perhaps, the results of this study may be interpreted to suggest that
the “Continental European Universal Banking” model, in the sense of banks combining lending
and securities business, is becoming relevant for the EU.  There is also an indication that as
equity and bond finance grows in importance, and as the US relaxes laws preventing the
formation of Universal Banking and bancassurance, a process of convergence between the
emerging EU system and the evolving US system  seems to be underway.18
It is debatable whether business cycle swings have significantly influenced the
convergence in the EU financial system, in terms of the choice between internal and external
financing by NFCs.  No attempt has therefore been made in this study to control for the separate
cyclical swings in each country.  Moreover, cycles affecting each country are far from being
perfectly synchronised. 
4. Summary and Conclusion
This paper first notes that following the EU single market launched in 1993, and the recent
restructuring of banking systems by some EU countries, convergence of the financial systems in
the EU is expected to occur towards either the Anglo-Saxon model or the Continental model. 
Specifically, however, it is argued that convergence will only occur in terms of the methods by
which NFCs raise investment finance.  The paper therefore proposes and implements some
novel applications of econometric tests for convergence (hitherto popularised in the economic
growth literature) to determine whether there has been a shift towards convergence in terms of
bank debt, equity finance, bond issues and internal finance.  Models are specified for each of the
four elements of the capital structure of NFCs, and are estimated and tested using data from the
OECD flow of funds tables for the period 1972-1996 for seven EU member countries: Finland,
France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. 
The paper uncovers a number of interesting findings.  First, there is no significant
evidence of a tendency towards convergence among the EU member countries in terms of the
use of bank debt by NFCs.  Thus, contrary to the expectations of many policy makers and media
pundits, it would appear that over time and across the seven countries the NFCs have not shifted
towards the use of bank debt for financing new investment. Nor is there reliable evidence that
the EU member countries are converging towards a bank oriented system, in the context of an
increase in the relative share of the banking system in the overall financing of new investment by
NFCs.  These results seem to be impervious to a monetary policy stance involving exchange rate
or interest rate instruments.  Second, it is found that there has been a tendency towards
convergence among the EU member countries in terms of the use of equity finance by NFCs. 
Over time and across the seven EU member countries the NFCs have shifted towards the use of
equity finance for new investment; the equity finance has also increasingly become important as
a means of funding new investment by NFCs.  It would therefore appear that the EU member19
countries are converging towards a more capital market oriented financial system. Third, we find
that there is no reliable (significant) evidence that the EU member countries are converging
towards a bond (capital market oriented) system, in the context of an increase in the relative
share of the bond market in the overall financing of new investment by NFCs.  This
development may well be stimulated by the adoption of a single currency, however. Fourth, we
find that over time and across the seven countries the NFCs have converged in terms of the use
of internal funds (e.g. retained earnings) for financing new investment.  This evidence is
consistent with the pecking order theory of financing choices, and with the results obtained in
earlier studies by Corbett and Jenkinson (1994), Bertero (1994) and Edwards and Fischer (1994)
who found high and increasing levels of internal financing in most of the OECD countries
(particularly evident in the UK and Germany).
In general, however, the evidence suggest some form of overall convergence of the EU
financial systems on a variant of the Anglo-Saxon model, depicting heavy reliance on internal
financing with bank intermediated lending decreasing in importance but increasingly competing
with direct financing via equity and bond markets in the declining market for the external
financing of investment.
Notes
1. The “pecking order theory of financing choices” is discussed in standard Corporate
Finance textbooks e.g. Brealey and Myers (1996, p. 498-503).
2. Securitisation has involved two key processes: disintermediation (a switch from indirect
(bank intermediated, loan) financing to direct financing using marketable securities); and
the process of making loans tradable using (loan) asset backed securities, thereby
facilitating asset management by banks.
3. The aggregate flow of funds (sources and uses) data is mainly taken from the "OECD
Financial Accounts" (Part 2 of "OECD Financial Statistics") Table 33F for Non
Financial Corporation (NFCs).  Some items of data for the UK were not available in the
OECD tables and had to be taken from the CSO publication "Financial Statistics", Table
8.2 (Sources and Uses of Capital Funds of Industrial and Commercial Companies).  The
definition of NFCs varies somewhat between countries.20
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